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Abstract
We empirically investigate the welfare effects of providing product quality infor-
mation to consumers in the form of expert opinion scores in a setting of asymmetric
information. Identification of the effects of the provision of information comes from a
field experiment in the retail wine market. We use a monthly-product-store panel scan-
ner data set, collected before and during the field experiment, which involves treating
a random subset of wine products by displaying expert scores in one store, and com-
paring sales in similar non-treated stores. Using a structural random utility model
of demand, we show that, on average, consumers significantly value one score point
increase due to the treatment by about 0.5 to 0.7 cents. As a consequence, for a bottle
featuring an average score of 83, consumers would be willing to pay additionally be-
tween 20 and 60 cents more due to the treatment. Using counterfactual scenarios, we
find that adding expert opinion shelf labels increases consumer surplus. In addition,
allowing for strategic price reactions by retailers would lead to an overall significant
welfare improvement given that (i) consumers significantly value the score information
albeit facing higher prices, and (ii) the profits increase with the market power of firms.
Keywords: Random utility models, Structural random coefficients discrete choice
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This paper uses a randomly assigned introduction of expert opinion scores into the wine
market to estimate demand and infer the implied revealed preference willingness to pay
(WTP) for expert opinion information in the form of scores and implied marginal costs of
suppliers under different wine pricing scenarios. Using the structural demand and supply
model estimates we simulate welfare changes due to adding expert opinion labels into the
market.
We collect the data by designing and implementing a choice experiment in one retail
store, where we display expert opinion score labels for a random subset of wines across four
weeks. We take advantage of unique data set comprised of retail scanner data and a field
experimental data set, and build on the methodological breakthroughs that have arisen in
the discrete choice literature when analyzing consumer demand (see McFadden 1999 and
Train 2002 for a survey). Using a field experiment, we combine evidence from the revealed
preference variation in observed choices to specify and estimate flexible random coefficient
logit demand models and supply pricing models.
Our research goal is to empirically investigate the welfare effects of revealing product
quality to consumers in the form of expert opinion score information, in a setting of asym-
metric information such as the wine market, where consumers know less than producers
about the quality distribution of products in their available choice sets. In order to inves-
tigate the welfare effects due to expert opinion shelf labels being implemented, we specify
a demand and supply model and consider extreme cases for the price decisions of suppliers.
First, we assume that there is perfect competition, with prices set to marginal costs, allow-
ing the estimation of changes in welfare with and without shelf labels. In this case, prices
are not adjusted in the counterfactual expert score scenario. Second, we consider the other
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extreme case where suppliers have market power. Given demand and supply side behavior
cases, we can bound marginal costs of the wine products. Assuming that prices are chosen
in a Bertrand Nash fashion, we recover an upper bound on marginal costs by subtracting
from prices the estimated margins under firms’ Bertrand Nash pricing. Assuming monopoly
pricing, we recover a lower bound on products’ marginal costs as the difference between
observed prices and implied monopoly markups. Using marginal cost estimates and demand
preferences and allowing for strategic reactions by retailers, we estimate welfare gains for
revealing scores from counterfactual scenarios.
Given asymmetric information on product quality, consumers must infer quality based on
observable attributes at the time of purchase. High quality is typically positively correlated
with higher average prices in many markets (Rao 2005; Shiv, Carmon, and Ariely 2005).
Evidence from blind tastings in the wine market indicates that consumers attribute a positive
premium to wines that are perceived as higher quality. Bonnet, Hilger, and Villas-Boas
(2020) shows that uninformed consumers’ purchases are consistent with beliefs that high
quality is positively related to wine prices. In many markets, experts provide additional
insight about the quality of products they evaluate, and develop expert ratings or scores
that are commonly available to consumers. Producers value expert scores and opinions
if they are able to charge higher prices for their high quality products, as they use the
higher scores as a product differentiation device to increase market power (e.g., for wine see
Ali, Lecocq, and Visser 2008). On the contrary, whether consumers value expert opinion
information in this setting remains an unanswered question. Following the advertisement
literature as conceptualized in Johnson and Myatt (2006), specifying how the shelf labels
enter the random utility demand model, we consider that the expert scores shelf labels can
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have either a role of creating a “hype,” by influencing directly the indirect utility in the form
of a demand shifter for the products receiving the label in a similar fashion, or can have
an informative role, by influencing how consumers value an advertised attribute among the
products in the choice set.
The first contribution of this paper is to provide structural demand estimates of wine
products as a function of wine attributes, such as price, region of production, varietal, color,
brand, and expert opinion scores, using revealed choices through scanner purchase data.
The revealed choice approach has the advantage of ‘face validity’, as the data are consumers’
actual choices when faced with real constraints on their own resources and the products
available (Hensher, Louviere, and Swait 1998; Whitehead et al. 2008). Consumers consider
the internal costs and benefits of their potential choices and experience the consequences of
their actions. Choices based on perceived costs and benefits better reflect the values of the
population and allow for more valid estimates of willingness to pay. Carson et al. (1996)
shows through meta-analysis that estimates from stated and revealed preferences differ.
Previous work using the same wine experiment data estimated the reduced form demand
effects of wine scores (Hilger, Rafert, and Villas-Boas 2011). Subsequent work by Bonnet,
Hilger, and Villas-Boas (2020) sought to identify the mechanisms underlying these demand
effects, attributing value to different quality grades through the use of a 75 to 100 numeric
score. The lack of previous research estimating the value of expert scores, in wine or other
markets, is related to the challenge of identifying unbiased demand responses to scores that
are uncorrelated with other strategic decisions taken by firms, such as pricing, branding, and
product portfolio assortment choices. This challenge is circumvented in this paper, given that
the treatment of wines (through revealing their expert scores) is randomly assigned across
4
Wine and Experts
the potentially scored wine products and is uncorrelated with marketing variables of the
wine producers and the retailer. The treated wines had their scores displayed though a
label placed on the supermarket shelf underneath the product price tag. When we ran the
experiment, we ensured that neither the retailer, nor the producing vineyards, adjusted their
marketing variables to take into account the experimentally disclosed score information at
the point of purchase.
The second contribution of the paper is to estimate welfare effects, in terms of changes
in consumer willingness to pay (WTP) and changes in firm profits, due to expert opinion
score treatment. We measure welfare changes due to the introduction of expert opinion
information, as a reduction of asymmetric information in the wine market. We develop and
estimate a structural model (as in Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes 1995; Nevo 2000) of wine
demand, specifying a flexible random utility choice framework (as in McFadden 1974; Mc-
Fadden 1981; Train 2002). That is, we analyze actual response behavior within a designed
field experiment for wine retail products to directly estimate the revealed preferences and
corresponding welfare effects of expert opinion scores as additional wine product attributes.
In so doing, we will provide industry participants and policy makers with important infor-
mation on the efficacy of score based quality-labels, as well as information on consumers’
actual wine preferences and consequences for firms’ ability to change prices given displayed
expert opinion labels (Ali, Lecocq, and Visser 2008).
Related empirical literature has analyzed the extent to which product quality infor-
mation affects consumer behavior: including branding (Montgomery and Wernerfelt 1994),
mandatory product labeling (Jin and Leslie 2003; Kiesel and Villas-Boas 2007), experimental
labeling (Kiesel and Villas-Boas 2007), consumer peer-user ratings (Anderson and Magruder
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2012; Jacobsen 2015), and advertising (Ackerberg 2001; Ackerberg 2003). Closely related
to our paper, besides Hilger, Rafter, and Villas-Boas (2011), which estimates reduced form
effects of the same experiment of displaying expert scores of wine, are papers by Berger,
Sorensen, and Rasmussen (2010) on the book market and Reinstein and Snyder (2005) on
the movie industry. The key identification of the effects of expert opinions on movie demand
in Reinstein and Snyder (2005) results from exploiting the timing of movie reviews by Siskel
and Ebert. While they find no overall effect of reviews, they show that positive reviews
increased box office revenues for narrowly-released movies and dramas, although it remains
to be explained why. In the book industry, Berger, Sorensen, and Rasmussen (2010) find
that both positive and negative reviews in the New York Times increase book sales. Our
major contribution, extending all previous works, is that we are the first to assess demand
side valuation of expert opinion labels using actual point of purchase decisions of consumers
in a field experiment setting. Indeed, we use wine purchases in a store of a California retail
chain before and after the label introduction as well as wine purchases in other stores of the
same retail chain as a control for other demand shocks. We utilize a flexible discrete choice
model (e.g. Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes 1995; McFadden and Train 2000; Nevo 2000; Nevo
2003; Swait and Andrews 2003) that incorporates heterogeneity in demand. The framework
allows the empirical testing of the null hypothesis that the displayed expert opinion scores in
the treatment labels are not valued by consumers. We estimate the value of the scores due
to our intervention at the treated store, and as a result what we estimate does not reflect
the full value of the score of wine quality.
Our demand estimates suggest that consumers would need to be offered a discount if
wines feature a score less and equal than 71 and that, on average, they value a score point
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increase by about 0.5 to 0.7 cents due to the treatment. As a consequence, for a bottle
featuring an average score of 83 consumers would be willing to pay additionally between 20
and 60 cents more if the score was revealed to them in the form of a label. In terms of wine
regions, consumers are on average willing to pay 2 dollars more for California wines relative to
all other wine regions together and there is substantial variation in estimated preferences for
wine varietals. We use the demand estimates and estimated supply margins and marginal
costs under different supply scenarios to investigate what are the welfare changes due to
adding our expert opinion score experimental labels. The baseline prices are prices without
scores being revealed, which happens in the pre-period in the treated store. Then we simulate
the new equilibrium prices that result from adding labels under Bertrand Nash and under
monopoly pricing in the treated store in the pre-period. We estimate changes in choices
that imply significant consumer surplus gains, which is due to the fact that consumers
value scores positively and also given that firms setting prices as Bertrand Nash do not
significantly change their prices given revealed expert opinion scores in the shelf labels.
However, in the monopolist case, when revealing expert opinion scores that are positively
valued by consumers, firms are able to raise prices significantly and welfare net effects are
lower than in more competitive supply scenarios. We then find a significant net welfare gain
of adding expert opinion labels under competition (as consumers value the information and
switch to wines receiving scores) and a significant net welfare gain under Bertrand Nash
(given that prices do not change much in this case), and a lower welfare gain under the least
competitive supply setting of a monopolist seller (given that prices increase significantly on
average). Overall we estimate that adding expert score labels leads to a significant welfare
gain representing about eight percent of total revenue from wine sales in this store.
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In the next section we present the
data and experimental variation used. Next we specify the structural demand model, derive
how to obtain the implied estimates of consumer valuation for expert scores using macro-level
aggregate choice data for treated and control stores and discusses the structural estimates.
In the following section, we specify and estimate consumer surplus changes, profit changes
and total welfare changes under alternative supply scenarios and policy scenarios of changing
the expert scores shelf labels that consumer see when making choices. Lastly, we discuss
implications of our findings and provide closing remarks.
The Experiment and the Data
In April 2006, wine ratings from a proprietary wine scoring system were displayed in one
retail grocery store for four weeks, henceforth defined as the treatment store. We randomly
selected 127 products to be labeled among wine products with scores, which corresponds
to displaying scores for about 20% of the wines in the consumers’ choice set. Each label
featured the name of the proprietary scoring system and the wine’s score. In theory, wine
scores range from 0 up to the highest score of 100; however, scores less than 70 are not
released by the rating agency.
The treated store is in the same marketing division as a set of potential control stores. The
pricing, promotions, and display layouts are common among all of the stores in a marketing
division, leading to a good balance of observable determinants of quantities of wine sold,
originating from the retail marketing strategy.
The choice of the treated store was made at random among a subset of stores of the same
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retail chain, within driving distance from the residence of the researchers, as the treatment
had to be done manually by us. During the first week, we tag all the treated wines in the
treated store in the evening of a Tuesday. The second week, also on the evening on the
Tuesday, we visited the treated store again to make sure all our labels were still up and
correctly showing. They always were. The only time we had to reattach a new label tag was
when a certain product had a price change (which was set in advance and independently on
our treatment). In the control stores, the same products also had the same price change,
based on the usual price schedule set in advance and common to the treatment and control
stores. We want to be clear that the prices did not change because we labeled, the prices
change according to the pricing and discounting strategy set by the central division. The
treated retail store is in northern California, and we use the set of stores that exhibit pre
period trends similar to the treated store. Controls are also located in the same North
California region, but not closely located to the treated store to avoid consumers possibly
shopping at both treatment and control stores. The type of store is a typical retail store, it is
not a wine specialty store, and it is also not a hard discount retailer. The treated and control
stores in the data have similar store square footage, and the same store format, marketing
promotions, and displays. Finally, control stores used in the empirical analysis also share
similar socio-economic characteristics to the treated store in terms of zip code level census
observables.
Figure 1 displays the kernel density of the score distribution for treated wines in the
treated store and the kernel density of the score distribution of the unlabeled products sold
in the control stores, given that we can see the same products in the control stores. Given
a Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test for equality of the distributions, we cannot reject that the
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distribution of scores are equal across the treated and control stores. Therefore, there exists
a balanced match in the distribution of labeled wines across our sample.
The Scanner Data
We use a weekly scanner data set for Northern Californian stores from January 2003 to May
2006. We choose the four control Northern Californian stores (among a total of 38 potential
stores to compare to) that match the treated store in terms of pre-period trends in labeled
wines. The data provide a unique wine product code identifier (UPC), the name of the wine
(including varietal), the number of bottles sold, the pre-discount (gross) shelf price paid, and
any retail discount pricing offered. We aggregate the weekly sales data to the month-level
for each store to generate the total number of bottles sold per month, the average shelf price,
the average price paid (the shelf price net of discounts), and whether a bottle of wine was
discounted during the given month. In the treated store, we have 10,508 observations for
monthly sales of treated wine products. In the four control stores, the number of observations
total to 45,585 with the same average number of observations by each of the control store.
For those wines for which proprietary wine score data exist, we merge the wine score
data into the scanner data. In addition, we collect a detailed product attribute data set,
identifying the brand of the wine product, varietal (such as Chardonnay, Cabernet, Merlot,
Pinot, etc.), type (red, white, or rose), regional designation, and imported status, which we
merge with the scanner data set.
Summary statistics are reported in Table 1 for April, the treatment month, and for March,
the pre-treatment month in 2006. We report descriptive statistics for the treated store and
for the control stores in the first and second columns, respectively. The summary statistics
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report average quantity sold during the pre-treatment (March) and during the treatment
month (April), along with the standard deviations. In the treated store, 22 bottles per
product among the labeled wines are sold on average, while 11 bottles are sold in the control
stores during the month of March. Average prices in March and April are 11 dollars for
treated wines. The averages are not statistically different between treated and control stores.
Approximately 93 percent of the wine consumers purchase is discounted in March and in
April, across both the treated and control stores. Average and standard deviation of scores
for treated and control stores are similar and average scores are 83 and standard deviation
are 3. Additionally, Figure 1 attests that the treated and control stores had similar average
scores along with very similar score distributions. In both the treated store and control
stores, 50 percent of products are red wines. The proportions of white wine are also similar
across the treated and control stores.
Ultimately, there are three kinds of wine products in the sample: the labeled wines,
i.e., the treated wines with scores, unlabeled wines with scores (that is, wines that although
having been rated with an expert score do not receive the treatment label in our experiment),
and the unlabeled wines without scores. Moreover, among labeled (treated) wines it is not
always the case that a higher score is associated with a higher average price and or a higher
maximum price level displayed.1
The treatment store has 20% of the observations in the data, we have one treatment store
and four control stores with the same average number of observations by each of the control
store. In 2006, the post treatment period consists of a total of number of 748 observations
1See the online Appendix for summary statistics of the treated wines and comparisons among the three kinds
of wines in the sample.
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in the post period (months of April and May) and 3059 observations in the controls, (an
average of 764 per control store) in the post period. Regarding the pre-treatment period
(from January to March), we have the same proportion of observations, the observations for
the treatment groups are one fourth of the number of observations of the four controls, with
1160 and 4858 observations respectively (an average per control store is 1215) in 2006.
Given the total quantity Q of wine sold monthly by store, we construct product market
shares by dividing each product’s quantity sold by the total quantity Q. At most, a wine
product represents 8 percent of total monthly wine sales in a store, and the density of
market shares are very similar between treated and control stores. To estimate the causal
effect of revealing expert scores on consumer demand and valuation, it is crucial that there
are similar pre-period trends across treated and control stores for products in the analysis,
with respect to quantity sold and market shares. Figure 2 shows that trends in the monthly
total market shares of labeled products are quite similar between the treated and control
stores. The similarity in trends allows us to investigate the causal effects of the introduction
of displaying score labels on demand choices and, given structural demand estimates, to
infer consumer WTP for the provision of scores and then perform counterfactual simulations
given demand and supply pricing models.
The Structural Consumer Random Utility Demand Model
We model wine demand as a random utility model from buying wine. Using a store-product-
month-level panel data set, along with product characteristics data, we estimate flexible
specifications of discrete choice structural revealed preference models of consumer demand
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(McFadden 1974; Train 2002). Modeling consumer choice as the demand for product bundle
of observable attributes, we are able to estimate a dollar value for each attribute. Values
of consumers’ WTP for expert information are empirically estimated through the addition
of an expert opinion attribute to the product space, which is introduced through the field
experiment. The discrete choice model (e.g. Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes 1995; McFadden
and Train 2000; Nevo 2000; Nevo 2003; Swait and Andrews 2003) also offers flexibility in
incorporating heterogeneity in preferences via a random coefficient.2
Starting from a random utility framework (e.g. McFadden 1974; Train 2002), where both
the product attributes as well as a random term are assumed to enter linearly, the utility
from buying a certain product j at time t for the consumer i can be described as:
(1) Uijt = aj + at − αipjt +Xjtβ + γTjtScorej + ξjt + εijt,
where a product j is defined as a particular wine UPC sold at a certain store, aj is a product
(UPC-Store) fixed effect capturing the intrinsic preference for product j and at is a monthly
time fixed effect to control for unobserved demand shocks across periods. The shelf price
of product j at month t is denoted by pjt and the marginal utility of price is αi. In γ,
we measure consumers’ marginal utility for the labeled score experimentally displayed on
2When confronting the hedonic (Rosen 1974) and discrete choice models (McFadden 1974), Wong (2018)
shows that under certain conditions, an hedonic model and a standard logit model can give similar marginal
WTP. Some papers compare WTP derived from both models: they generally found that WTP are higher
with discrete choice models. Sinha, Caulkins, and Cropper (2018) estimate both models to get WTP. They
think that WTP are better estimated as discrete choice models allows to incorporate more heterogeneity
and uses information on market shares, which the hedonic method does not, it only uses prices.
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product j. Tjt is a dummy variable that is equal to one during the treatment period in the
treatment store and equal to zero otherwise, and Scorej is the value of the displayed score
for product j. A treated store indicator, a treated wine indicator, a treated month indicator
and some interactions are included in Xjt. The vector Xjt also contains regional, varietal
or color information about the product j. The term ξjt accounts for monthly changes in
factors such as shelf space or positioning of the product, among others, that affect consumer
utility, and are observed by consumers and firms but not by the researcher. Lastly, εijt is
an i.i.d. type I extreme value distributed error term, that captures consumer idiosyncratic
preferences.
To allow for category expansion or contraction, we include an outside good (no-purchase
option), indexed by j = 0, whose mean utility is normalized to zero. Therefore, its utility is
given by the idiosyncratic term only: Ui0t = εi0t.
Let the αi coefficient vary according to
(2) αi = α + σvi, vi ∼ N(0, 1),
where α and σ, parameters to be estimated, represent the mean utility for price and the
deviation to this mean across consumers respectively, and vi captures unobserved household
characteristics. We assume a parametric distribution for vi, denoted by P (v), which is
independently and identically distributed as a standard normal distribution.
We rewrite the utility of consumer i for product j at period t as:
(3) Uijt = δjt(pjt, Xjt, Tjt, Scorej, ξjt; a, α, β, γ) + µijt(pjt, vi;σ) + εijt,
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where δjt is the mean utility and µijt is the deviation from the mean utility that allows for
consumer heterogeneity in the marginal utility response to the treatment.
The probability that good j is chosen is the probability that good j maximizes the





k=1 exp(δkt + µikt)
where N is the total number of products.
Let the distribution of µijt across consumers be denoted by F (µ). Then the aggregate







k=1 exp(δkt + µikt)
dF (µ).
Estimating Average Marginal Utility and Price Endogeneity
The demand model represents consumer choice between different wine products over time,
where a product is perceived as a bundle of attributes, including expert scores and price.
A product-store fixed effect is included to capture constant observed and unobserved prod-
uct (UPC-Store) factors that affect demand. The econometric error that remains in ξjt
will therefore only include the changes in unobserved product characteristics across time
periods such as unobserved consumer level determinants of demand. Prices are set at the
wine-price-marketing division level, which covers all of the stores in the sample. Prices are
then determined for a set of stores, rather than at an individual store level. Moreover, we
15
Wine and Experts
are certain that prices do not adjust during the experiment as explained. However, some
endogeneity price issues could remain from omitted brand characteristics that would vary
cross time period and we should take into account. In particular, in the presence of endo-
geneity, the marginal utility of price α would be biased towards zero given that consumers
see unobservable features of each wine product ξjt in (7) when making choices that could be
positively correlated with prices. As a consequence, the resulting estimates of WTP would
be overestimated, and the welfare effects would also be biased. It is therefore important to
use instruments in random utility demand estimation (Ackerberg and Rysman 2005; Bajari
and Benkard 2003; Reynaert and Verboven 2014).
In order to address this concern we follow two strategies. First we take advantage of
the panel structure of the data and control for unobserved time-invariant determinants of
demand with fixed effects. In addition, to take into account for unobservable features that
could vary across time periods, we use instruments for prices. Excluded cost shifters, such
as input prices that are independent of the wine demand error term, are good instrumental
variables but difficult to find. We then instead use instruments that are the characteristics
of competing products (Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes 1995). They are good candidates as
they are independent of the utility of the product considered (the demand of the product j
depends only on the characteristics of the product j) but they shift equilibrium markups as
the economic theory tell us (see Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes 1995), and then they shift retail
prices. In our structural random utility model, we assume that the utility of the consumers
depends on the varietal or color information as product characteristics. Considering this
information for competing products leads to compute the number of competing products by
varietal or color (red, white, or rose). The intuition is that consumer substitution patterns
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are stronger within these different types of wines. A product then competes more with
products of the same type, and hence, equilibrium markups depend on the presence on
competing products within each wine type.
The empirical investigation is presented in Table 2. This Table presents the Logit results
from estimation equation (7) as an OLS specification in column 1 and the fixed effects
specification in column 2. In the last column, the IV demand specification investigates
endogeneity of prices formally and assesses the changes in the marginal utility of price α. To
estimate demand parameters controlling for price endogeneity issue, we use a 2SLS estimation
method. The dependent variable in all specifications is the ln(Sjt)− ln(S0t). The covariates
in the demand model used are product fixed effects, randomly assigned treatment status by
store and month, the score, and price.3 The first row pertains to the estimate of the marginal
utility of price. In the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) specification, we find that consumers
significantly dislike increases in price; the significant estimate of α is −0.075. When we add
product fixed effects in column 2, the marginal utility of price becomes more negative, which
is the direction away from the omitted variable bias of OLS that was driving α towards zero.
The coefficient is now significant and equal to −0.235. When using instrumental variables,
the coefficient becomes slightly more negative, now −0.245; the first stage F statistic is large
and significantly different from the critical value (F stat is 81.4, with a p value of 0.000),
so we reject the null that the first stage coefficients of the two instrumental variables are
jointly zero when explaining prices. In practical terms, however, we note that when using
3It is not the case that all higher scores are correlated with higher prices, and moreover, the variation we use
is a score treatment for a subset of wines with scores, so we do not have a high correlation of treatment and
score variable with the price variable (cf the online Appendix).
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panel fixed effects as controls we deal with most of the omitted variable bias concerns of
the OLS specification. In the rest of the paper, we use instruments and fixed effects as
controls in order to estimate unbiased marginal utility for price that is then used in the
welfare estimates.
Estimating Heterogeneous Marginal Utilities
Given the concern investigated in the simple Logit analysis, we proceed to allow for hetero-
geneity in demand by adding random coefficients and also instrument for price. We estimate
the random parameters Logit demand model from product (UPC-store) monthly market
shares using the GMM-estimator proposed by Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) and Nevo
(2001). We only allow for consumer unobserved heterogeneity in the treatment sensitivity
given that we do not have demographic variables in the stores. When estimating demand,
the goal is to derive parameter estimates that produce product market shares close to the
observed shares. Predicted market shares of each wine product j for draw i are given by
(6) ŝijt =
exp(âj + ât − α̂ipjt +Xjtβ̂ + γ̂TjtScorej)
1 +
∑N
k=1 exp(âk + ât − α̂ipkt +Xktβ̂ + γ̂TktScorek)
.
where the market share is obtained by averaging (6) over all the standard normal draws,




r=1 ŝrjt, where R are the number of standard normal draws of vi.
As shown, this procedure is non-linear in the demand parameters to be estimated. We
follow Berry (1994), who constructs a demand side equation that is linear in the parameters
to be estimated. This follows from equating the estimated product market shares4 to the
4For the random coefficient logit model, the product market share in equation (5) is approximated by the
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observed shares and solving for the mean utility across all consumers, defined as:
(7) δjt(a, α, β, γ) = aj + at − αpjt +Xjtβ + γTjtScorej + ξjt.
For the random coefficient logit model, solving for the mean utility (as in Berry 1994)
has to be done numerically (see Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes 1995; and Nevo 2001). Once
this inversion has been made, one obtains equation (7) which is linear in the parameter
associated with all wine attributes. The estimates are obtained by a fixed effects OLS
regression. We let a, α, β, γ, σ be the demand side parameters to be estimated, where the
linear parameters are (a, α, β, γ) and σ is the price non-linear random coefficient parameter.
In the random coefficient logit model, the parameters are obtained by feasible Simulated
Method of Moments (SMOM) following Nevo’s (2000) estimation algorithm, which requires
equation (7).5 Given the estimated demand marginal utility parameters, we finally obtain
estimates of average WTP for the labels by dividing the estimates for γ by the average
marginal utility of price α.
The demand model estimates are presented in Table 3. In column (1), we estimate de-
mand with respect to a regional dummy for California, a discounted price, a score, treatment
store and period interactions with and without the score variable, and the coefficients of in-
terest, associated with the “Score X Labeled Wines X Treated Store X Treated Period” and
Logit smoothed accept-reject simulator.
5The aim is to concentrate the simulated GMM objective function such that it will be only a function of the
non-linear parameters. By expressing the optimal vector of linear parameters as a function of the non-linear




“Labeled Wines X Treated Store X Treated Period” variables. In column (2), we estimate
demand as in column (1), with the inclusion of varietal fixed effects. Finally, column (3)
repeats the specification in column (2) but uses instrumental variables for price. Starting
with the price coefficients, in column (1), in an OLS specification, the estimated average
marginal utility of price is −0.078 and is significant. When adding varietal fixed effects, the
price coefficient becomes more negative −0.166, and the instrumental variables estimate in
column (3) for the marginal utility of price is −0.232. We also find significant price hetero-
geneity given the standard deviation equal to 0.1. The preferred specification is in column
(3), as it was also for the Logit specifications, using instrumental variables to deal with the
endogeneity of prices when estimating demand.
We also feature all the lower order terms of the interactions of interest that appear in
Table 3. For instance, given the non-significant coefficient of “Treated Store X Treated
Period”, we see that unlabeled wines do not have a significant mean utility. For the two
difference in difference causal coefficients of interest, we find that the “Labeled Wine X
Treated Store X Treated Period” has a negative mean utility of −0.498 and that the mean
utility of each score point labeled, given by “Score Level X Label Wine X Treated Store X
Treated Period”, is significant and equal to 0.007. Taken together, we interpret the joint
estimate given as −0.498+0.007 x ScoreLevel as the causal effect on the mean utility of our
treatment. This causal effect is estimated to be a negative mean utility for scores less than
0.498/0.007 = 71.4 and positive for scores larger than 71.4. Looking at the “Score Level X
Label Wine X Treated Store X Treated Period” coefficient in Table 3 , namely 0.007, we
once again reject the null that the score labels just produce a “hype” effect on demand,
common to all labeled products willingness to pay. In fact, our evidence is consistent with
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label content specific information, in terms of the score level, significantly affecting the mean
utility of consumers.
Finally, in terms of wine regions, consumers place a positive and significant marginal
utility for California wines and for most varietals.
WTP for Wine Attributes and Expert Opinion Experimentally Displayed Scores
Given the estimated model parameters in column (3) of Table 2, and also in addition column
(3) of Table 3, we first recover, for each score level, the implied WTP for the labels. The
top Panel A of Figure 3 displays the predicted WTP on the vertical axis, for score levels on
the horizontal axis, by dividing the marginal utility of labels and scores in the treated store
and the treatment period by the average marginal utility of price following Train (2003).
We then obtain estimates of the average WTP for a change in a score point. The solid
line features the predicted additional average WTP for labels, given the Logit estimates in
column (3) of Table 2, and is a linear function of the score given by −0.368+0.005∗Score
0.245
. The
dashed line represents the average WTP given the Random Coefficient Logit estimates of
column (3) in Table 3, and is given by −0.498+0.007∗Score
0.232
. First, our demand estimates suggest
that consumers would need to be offered a discount if wines feature a score less and equal
than 71, given that, for the Logit model, when the score is below 72 the WTP becomes
negative, whereas for the random coefficient this happens for scores below 71. Second, on
average, consumers value a score point increase by about 0.5 cents, which corresponds to
the slope of the solid line of the Logit specification, to 0.7 cents for the random Coefficient
specification in the dashed line. As a consequence, for a bottle featuring an average score of
83 consumers would be willing to pay additionally between 20 cents (solid line) and 60 cents
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more (dashed line) if the score was revealed to them in the label.6
In the bottom Panel B of Figure 3, we depict for each of the labeled score levels in the
data on the horizontal axis, the average price per score, and the total estimated average
WTP of the wines using Logit and Random coefficient Logit demand estimates. For both
demand estimates, we see that the WTP is similar to the average price for scores of 72 and
that consumers are willing to pay more than the average price for all other score levels.
Welfare Changes in Counterfactuals With Expert Scores’ Labels
In order to investigate the welfare effects due to expert opinion shelf labels being imple-
mented, we first specify a supply model and consider three cases for the price decisions
of suppliers. First, we assume that there is perfect competition, prices are set equal to
marginal costs, and we recover the highest bound on marginal costs. Therefore, we can
estimate changes in welfare with and without shelf labels when prices do not adjust given
counterfactual labeling scenarios. Then, we consider the case when suppliers have market
power. We can also provide bounds on marginal costs of products under noncompetitive
pricing behavior. First, assuming that prices are chosen in a Bertrand Nash fashion, we
recover an intermediate level of marginal costs by subtracting from prices the margins under
Bertrand Nash. Second, assuming monopoly pricing, we recover the lower bound on prod-
ucts’ marginal costs, given by the difference between observed prices and implied monopoly
(larger) markups.
6Assessing the WTP of expert opinions in the wine market is a previously unexplored avenue in the literature.
However, we could find some WTP estimates for some other characteristics of wine, deduced from consumer
questionnaires (e. g. Loureiro 2003; Sellers-Rubio and Nicolau-Gonzalbez 2016).
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Given all these supply scenarios, we simulate counterfactual choices and new equilibrium
prices, and estimate bounds on the resulting implied welfare changes. In particular, we
break up the effect of expert opinion score labels on welfare into two effects. Keeping
prices constant, which corresponds to a competitive supplier model, we estimate the pure
consumption switching effect with provided expert opinion score labels. Allowing for prices
to adjust, we estimate the competitive change effect in the counterfactual simulations with
expert score labels.
Counterfactual Simulations under Competitive Supplier Case
Given that marginal costs are constant regardless of expert opinion score shelf labels im-
plemented and regardless of the score levels provided, prices of products remain unchanged
when we simulate consumer choices with expert opinion score shelf labels. We thus focus
on the changes in consumer surplus only in order to estimate the welfare effects of coun-
terfactuals assuming a competitive supply side. Over the pre treatment period where we
observe the consumer choices given no shelf labels, we simulate consumer choices with labels
keeping prices unchanged. We then compute, in both situations when the shelf labels are
available or not, the consumer surplus, ceteris paribus (prices unchanged) following Small
and Rosen (1981) and also the approach found in Allenby, et. al (2014). The expected
consumer surplus, CSi, which corresponds to the compensating variation for a change in










where α denotes the average marginal utility of price and C is a constant. We then compute
the consumer surplus when shelf labels are not displayed, the consumer surplus when shelf
labels are displayed and given the label claims. We then obtain the estimated changes in
consumer surplus from introducing the expert score labels in the treated stores as follows,







CSi is given by (8) and ∆CS denotes the total CS with labels minus the total CS without
labels.
In our case, we change the format in which the quality information is presented to the
consumer in the form of a score. Any difference in consumer surplus, therefore, reflects only
a possible unobserved change in consumer perceptions of attributes rather than underlying
actual quality differences (Nevo 2003) and allows us to interpret these changes as causal
effects of the additionally posted expert opinion scores on shelf labels, and consumer valuation
of this additional information.
We use a long historical pre treatment period, from January 2005 to March 2006, and the
structural demand estimates to simulate what consumer’s choices would be in the presence
of labels and to estimate change in consumer surplus from choices made when labels are not
available. The difference in surplus amounts to the welfare change due to the labels when
prices do not change. In other words, a positive change in surplus when adding labels means
that they are significantly valued by the consumer. By adding the total change in consumer




Counterfactual Simulations in a Noncompetitive Supply Side Model Case
In this case, we consider the retailer choosing prices to maximize profits. First, we assume
a Bertrand Nash competition, that is the retailer maximizes the profits from selling each
product given the price of the other products sold in the retailer. We also consider the most
extreme case scenario of market power in which prices for all products are set to maximize
the retailers’ total profit. Under these supply side scenarios, prices will change if labels are
present, and we will simulate the consumer choices, new equilibrium prices and resulting
welfare changes if prices adjust in the Bertrand Nash competition case or in the monopoly
multi-product retailer case.
The approach is as follows. First, given estimated demand, we recover marginal costs by
subtracting from observed prices the implied markups of the two supply cases considered.
In so doing, we obtain upper and lower bounds on marginal costs for all of the products,
by assuming both assumptions about the strategic behavior of the retailer described above.
The last step is the counterfactual simulation approach of adding expert opinion labels and
solving for new equilibrium prices in the pre treatment period under both supply scenarios.
Recovering Marginal Costs under Bertrand Nash Pricing
Every producer is maximizing its profits πj = (pj − cj)sj(p) by choosing each price pj
given the competitor prices and marginal costs cj, where p is the vector of retail prices.
7




Assuming Bertrand Nash pricing we have the first order conditions: ∀j = 1, ..., N , ∂πj
∂pj
=
sj(p) + (pj − cj) ∂sj∂pj .
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which is composed of the derivatives of market shares with respect to prices, evaluated at the
average marginal utility of price. Let T bn be the ownership matrix of the producer, which
corresponds to the identity matrix in this case. We can solve for Bertrand-Nash price cost
markups as mbn = p − cbn = −(T bn∆(p))−1s(p) where cbn is the vector of Bertrand Nash
marginal costs and s(p) is the vector of market shares.
The upper bound on marginal costs cbn given Bertrand Nash is then
ĉbn = p−mbn = p+ (T bn∆(p))−1s(p).
Recovering Marginal Costs under Monopoly Pricing
In this case, the prices are chosen to maximize the joint profit π =
∑N
k=1(pk − ck)sk(p), and








Given the ∆ matrix and letting Tm be the ownership matrix for joint profit price choices
where all elements are 1, then we can solve for monopolist price cost markups as mm =
p− cm = −(Tm ×∆(p))−1s(p) where cm is the vector of monopolist marginal cost and × is
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an element by element multiplication.
We then obtain the lower bound of marginal costs cm given monopolist pricing as
ĉm = p−mm = p+ (Tm ×∆(p))−1s(p).
Counterfactual Simulations and Estimated Welfare Changes
The final step is to perform simulations for estimated welfare changes under expert opinion
label counterfactuals, denoted as Label. In the pre treatment period from January 2005 to
March 2006, we allow consumers to face the expert opinion labels when they make their choice
under several supply scenarios given the costs recovered, and simulate the new equilibrium
prices and quantities in these counterfactuals. In particular, we simulate the equilibrium
(N×1) vector of retail prices p∗ under displayed shelf labeling scenarios Label and assuming
that retailers follow either a Bertrand Nash pricing game:





or assuming that retailers follow a monopoly game:
(11) p∗ = ĉm − (Tmr ∗∆r(p∗))
−1 s(p∗, Label).
We assess the changes in the welfare components (consumers’ and retailers’ surplus)
resulting from the changes of the simulated counterfactual equilibrium prices p∗ under the
labeling and different supply side scenarios, relative to the baseline observed equilibrium
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prices p in the pre period, without the labels. The expected consumer surplus, CSi is
defined as (8). We then obtain the estimated changes in consumer surplus from adding the
expert score shelf labels, as given by (9), which is defined as the total consumer surplus with
labels minus the total consumer surplus without labels. Given the new prices and market
shares, we estimate the changes in retail surplus as the change in the profits, and the sum
of that and changes in consumer surplus results in the total welfare changes. The goal is
to compare the estimated welfare effects of alternative labeling counterfactuals varying the
degree of ability of retailers to mark-up over the costs.
Simulation Results and Estimated Welfare Changes due to Experimental Shelf Labels
Given the structural demand and supply models, demand estimated parameters and esti-
mated costs, we use the pre-period in the treated store from January 2005 to March 2006
and simulate what would be the choices and resulting equilibrium prices if products received
the expert opinion score labels. In each simulation, we consider three supply settings: a
competitive one where prices do not change, a Bertrand Nash one, and a monopoly setting.
By adding expert opinion labels and resulting simulation, we interpret the effect given con-
stant prices (competitive supply) to be due to “Pure Consumption switching.” In addition,
by allowing prices to adjust as Bertrand Nash or as a local monopolist, this allows us to
estimate the “Competition effect” of changing the labels, given that firms may adjust the
prices when scores are displayed and introduce product differentiation into the choice set.
The top panel of this Figure 4 shows the average prices at baseline and corresponding
95% confidence interval, and next to that the simulated average price and 95% confidence
interval for simulated prices of adding labels under Bertrand Nash pricing competition.
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We see that we cannot reject that prices under Bertrand Nash with labels are similar to
the average baseline prices. In contrast, looking at the average price from simulating a
scenario post labels under monopolist supply, we see a significant increase in average price.
Not only does average price increase, the entire distribution of prices post labels under
monopoly pricing would shift to the right of the baseline price distribution, as we see in the
bottom panel of Figure 4. The bottom panel has the estimated kernel density of the price
distributions under baseline no Labels (black line density), Bertrand Nash Case (grey line
density - overlapping black one) and Monopolist Case with Labels (dashed line density).
We see that the monopolist case density is to the right of the baseline and Bertrand Nash
densities, which means prices overall went up with labels if firms have monopolist market
power, but prices remain basically unchanged with labels if firms are competing as Bertrand
Nash.
In Table 4, we present changes resulting from adding expert opinion score shelf labels
under competitive (row 1), Bertrand Nash (row 2), and monopoly pricing (row 3). Then,
in this table’s columns, we report first changes in average prices, then average change in
consumer surplus, average change in profits, and average change in total welfare. All are
in dollars per consumer (per capita). Standard errors are reported in parentheses. They
are then to be interpreted as the value of the shelf labels to consumers, retailer and welfare
overall.
We see that adding expert opinion score labels has a significant positive effect on consumer
surplus and welfare if prices remain constant, under the competitive supply case. If firms
are allowed to adjust prices post shelf labels, and are competing as Bertrand Nash, prices
increase by a very small amount, consumer surplus drop as compared to the competitive case,
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albeit in an economic insignificant way. Relative to baseline, by introducing scores in the
form of labels, this increases significantly retailer surplus and welfare in the Bertrand Nash
supply case. In this scenario, average prices increase significantly by less than one cent (an
economically minuscule price effect), consumer surplus increases by 2.02 dollars per capita,
and welfare increases by 2.38 dollars per capita, while profits increase significantly by 36
cents per capita. Finally, in the monopolist extreme case, by introducing scores in the form
of labels, this increases significantly consumer surplus, retail surplus and welfare relative
to baseline. In this scenario, average prices increase significantly by 45 cents, consumer
surplus increases by 1.59 dollars per capita (a significantly smaller increase than in the two
other supply competitive cases), and welfare increases significantly by 2.21 dollars per capita
(which is less than the Bertrand Nash case), while profits increase significantly by 64 cents
per capita (almost twice than in the Bertrand Nash Case). This would imply that 30%
(15% in the Bertrand Nash Case) of the per capita added value would go to the retailer.
Our average price increase is quite small when compared to the price effects of 2.3 Euros,
estimated by Ali et al (2014) for wines in the Bordeaux region. One possible reason is that
the sample of wines in their data are quite different from ours, have higher quality and also
of higher prices, given that our range of scores is 72 to 90, and their sample does not have
such low scores and features several scores in the mid 90s.
Conclusion
This paper estimates flexible discrete choice demand and supply models to infer whether
consumers place a significant value on the reduction of asymmetric information about wine
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quality, in the form of expert opinion score labels. We use a product store month data
set for treated and control stores, consisting of retail scanner data at the time of a field
experiment that reveals the expert opinion scores to retail consumers at the point of purchase,
to estimate the demand and supply structural model primitives, namely demand parameters
and marginal costs. In particular, we obtain an implied average willingness to pay of 0.5 to
0.7 cents per score point displayed in the labels and we find that there is heterogeneity in
WTP for wines originating from different regions.
Using counterfactual simulations, we estimate the changes in consumer surplus, retail
profits and welfare due to available quality information from expert opinion score labels,
assuming different benchmarks of retailer pricing behavior given the estimated demand model
and recovered marginal costs under these different supply models.
We show that adding expert opinion shelf labels increases differentiation and allows prices
to increase and firms to compete less, leading to an overall significant welfare improvement
given that (i) consumers significantly value the score information, and (ii) the profits increase
when firms are able to incorporate the new shelf labels when setting prices as Bertrand Nash
(and more so in a coordinated monopolist fashion). We estimate there to be a significant gain
in welfare of 2 dollars per capita, which when considering there to be about 10,000 consumers
by month (based on auxiliary data on a store at the consumer level) to be about 20,000
dollars, representing 7.8 percent of the revenues in this market. This suggests that disclosing
expert opinions results in small but significant positive welfare effects. Extrapolating to the
national market, given total US wine retail revenues for 2013 were $36.3 billion dollars,8 our
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Note: This figure displays jointly the kernel density estimates of the score distribution for the set of treated
products in the treated store and the kernel density estimates of the score distribution in control stores for
the same group of wine products treated in the treated store, given that we can see the same products in
the control stores. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test cannot reject the equality of treated wines scores’




Table 1: Summary Statistics of Wines for Treated and Control Stores
(1) (2)
Treated Store Control Stores
Wines Wines
Quantity (March) 21.68 10.76
(0.00) (0.00)
Quantity (April) 18.16 10.70
(0.00) (0.00)
Price (March) 10.51 10.76
(0.51) (0.52)
Price (April) 10.45 10.70
(0.49) (0.52)
% discounted (March) 93 93




% Red 49 50
% White 44 42
% Rose 7 7
Varietals
% Cabernet 15 16
% Chardonnay 26 24
% Gewurztraminer 5 5
% Merlot 16 15
% Pinot Noir 7 7
% Shirah 8 9
% Zinfandel 7 7
% Other Red Varietals 3 3
% Other White Varietals 12 13
Number Wines 404 421
Number Observations 10508 45585
Standard Deviations in parentheses. First column for Treated Store, next for Control stores.
Source: Scanner data set. Quantity is measured in number of bottles.
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Treatment Store 1 Control Store 1
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Control Store 4
Note: This figure displays jointly the evolution of the treated wine product market shares in the treated
and control stores in the pre treatment periods. Minus 1 means one period before the treatment, Minus 2









Table 2: OLS and IV Logit Wine Demand Estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Price -0.075∗∗∗ -0.235∗∗∗ -0.245∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Treated Store X Treated Period 0.044 0.066 0.065
(0.115) (0.076) (0.076)
Treated Store X Pre Period 0.238∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.018) (0.018)
Control Stores X Treated Period 0.124∗∗∗ 0.041 0.039
(0.048) (0.033) (0.033)
Labeled Wines X Treated Period -0.055 -0.042 -0.040
(0.052) (0.036) (0.036)
Labeled Wines X Treated Store -0.132∗∗∗ -0.069∗∗∗ -0.069∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.021) (0.021)
Score Level 0.007∗∗∗ 0.000 0.181
(0.000) (.) (0.156)
Score Level X Treated Store X Pre Period -0.001 -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Labeled Wine X Treated Store X Treated Period -0.335 -0.371∗∗ -0.368∗∗
(0.250) (0.168) (0.167)
Score Level X Labeled Wine X Treated Store X Treated Period 0.006∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.005∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant -6.117∗∗∗ -3.926 ∗∗∗ -20.266
(0.015) (0.275) (13.437)
Num of Obs. 56093 56093 56093
R squared 0.147 0.633 0.632
Product FE No Yes Yes
Instruments for Price No No Yes
First Stage F( 2, 56093) 81.400
p value Prob greater than F 0.000
Clustered errors in parentheses at the month level. Controls are best matched stores. The dependent
variable is the ln(market share of product)-ln(share of outside option).




Table 3: Random Coefficient Logit Wine Demand Estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Constant -6.432∗∗∗ -6.548∗∗∗ -7.024∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Treated Store X Treated Period 0.068 0.095 0.057
(0.113) (0.110) (0.112)
Treated Store X Pre Period 0.236∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.026) (0.027)
Control Stores X Treated Period 0.110∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ -0.007
(0.047) (0.046) (0.047)
Score 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Labeled Wine X Treated Store X Treated Period -0.464∗ -0.492∗∗ -0.498∗∗
(0.247) (0.240) (0.244)
Score Level X Labeled Wine X Treated Store X Treated Period 0.008∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.007∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Price -0.078∗∗∗ -0.166∗∗∗ -0.232∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.015) (0.025)
















Other Red Varietals 0.747∗∗∗ 0.614∗∗∗
(0.131) (0.135)
Other White Varietals 0.590∗∗∗ 0.499∗∗∗
(0.173) (0.172)
Price SD 0.000 0.100∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.011) (0.009)
GMM
Num of Obs. 56093 56093 56093
Instruments for Price No No Yes
Clustered errors in parentheses at the month level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
Coefficients on Lower Order Interactions of Treatment Store, Period,Score, and Labeled omitted due to space.
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Figure 3: Average WTP for Score Disclosure, Average Prices, and Average WTP by Score
Note: The top panel A of this Figure reports predicted average WTP from displaying the expert score
label for each score level: based on the Logit estimates of column (3) in Table 2 in solid line, and in a
dashed line based on the RC Logit estimates of column (3) in Table 3. The Bottom panel B depicts
average prices (in light grey), and the average WTP for each of the scores in the wine data set: based on
the Logit estimates in column (3) of Table 2 in black, and in diagonal pattern based on the random
coefficients demand estimates in Column (3) of Table 3.
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Note: The top panel of this figure reports average prices and 95% Confidence interval for baseline and
simulated prices of adding labels under Bertrand Nash and under monopolist supply cases. The bottom
panel has the estimated kernel density of the price distributions under baseline no labels (black line
density), Bertrand Nash case with labels (grey line density- overlapping black one: no change) and
monopolist case with labels (dashed line density). We see that the monopolist case density is to the right
of the baseline and Bertrand Nash densities, which means prices overall went up with labels if firms have




Table 4: Simulated Changes due to Expert Scores’ Labels
Price Average CS Average Profit Average Welfare
Change Change Change Change
($ per capita) ($ per capita) ($ per capita)
Adding Expert Opinion Scores
Competitive Supply 2.027 0.000 2.027
(0.007) (0.000) (0.007)
Bertran Nash Supply 0.001 2.024 0.359 2.383
(0.000) (0.007) (0.005) (0.011)
Monopoly Supply 0.452 1.578 0.643 2.221
(0.011) (0.004) (0.014) (0.012)
Simulated Average Changes, and standard errors in parentheses, in Prices, Consumer Surplus, Profits, and
Welfare when wines are identified according to expert opinion Scores’ labels. All estimates based on the
demand estimates and Simulations using the treated store only during the pre treatment period.
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